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Chapter 3 
Warlords and the Coalition in Afghanistan1 
This chapter focuses on the relationships between coalition forces and the so-called warlords of 
post-2001 Afghanistan. While the term “warlord” is frequently used in political and normative 
ways to evoke “brutality, racketeering and the suffering of civil communities,”2 these actors are 
astute political entrepreneurs whose legitimacy rests on “the power to make war effectively”3 
and who play critical roles in people’s access to the political arena and economic opportunities. 
They act at various times as the principal suppliers of governance to people in areas where they 
wield influence. As such, they cannot be, and have not been, ignored by ISAF. They have been 
instrumental to allied forces from the very beginning of the US-led intervention. In turn, they 
have exercised a surprising capacity to shape state-building and state formation processes to suit 
their interests by exploiting the cross-cutting agendas of external actors. While a multitude of 
warlords co-exist with the state in post-2001 Afghanistan, this chapter focuses on two typical 
cases: Abdul Rashid Dostum, the ethnic Uzbek leader of Northern Afghanistan and Ismail Khan, 
the self-proclaimed Amir of Herat.  
  It is often argued that the main objective of state-building is the uniformization of 
sovereignty, or conversely, the weakening and destruction of alternative forms of governance. 
Most international actors involved in Afghanistan (foreign governments, aid agencies, 
international organizations, etc.) therefore prefer that warlords recede into insignificance as the 
central state asserts its authority. While this state-building project promotes the construction of a 
state along the path most closely associated with the historical rise of western states, the political 
survival of Afghan warlords is an indication that the process is in reality being shaped by 
interactions between the state, the international community, and de facto power holders 
(warlords in particular). State-builders have to engage in a process of hybridization—arguably 
the real process of state formation—as they attempt to construct institutions that at least appear 
to conform to Weberian ideals of bureaucratic institutional and territorial control.  
Warlords are “by definition illegitimate and unrecognized.”4 It is therefore striking (and for 
some truly shocking) to see that coalition forces that are supposed to back and support the 
official democratically-elected government of Afghanistan have been in business with warlords 
since the very beginning of the US military intervention. The growing role of regular and 
irregular indigenous forces in external interventions raises practical concerns about the military 
and political objectives of the Afghan war and the nature of state-building in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. In this chapter, I show that warlords maximize their authority in permissive 
environments, that is in environments with limited external pressure. They take advantage of the 
heterogeneity of the international community, both within and outside NATO, to maximize their 
interests and survive. I chose two cases of warlordism that illustrate how warlords exert 
diplomacy and how it allows them to survive in changing environments.  
 
Working with the Devil: Afghan Model of Warfare and Warlord Strategy 
Coalition forces began to achieve a series of quick military victories soon after it began combat 
operations in October 2001. The success of the “Afghan model” of warfare—the combination of 
Special Operation Forces, precision-guided munitions and Northern Alliance militia forces—
quickly expelled Taliban forces from key cities around the country.5 Unfortunately, the “Afghan 
model”  did not support coalition state-building efforts. Afghan warlords took control of regional 
and national state institutions with the blessing of the Bush administration. Seeking short-term 
stability through deals with regional leaders to compensate the absence of a central state in turn 
empowered these illegitimate armed actors and prevented the long-term emergence of the said 
central state. This “warlord strategy”6 required “living with ambiguity:”7 US Special Operations 
Forces worked hand in hand with warlords in their fiefdoms in spite of their increasing 
stigmatization by human rights organizations.8  
Things started to change around 2003/2004. US policymakers began at that time to 
impose “new rules of the game”9 as most in the Bush administration believed the war in 
Afghanistan to be about to end. Wrote Michael Bhatia:  
 
[The] dominant post-Bonn discourse, particularly among external observers, has 
been that of the warlord challenge to the central government, which is partly a 
process of demythologizing the mujahideen. Practically, this is linked to advocacy 
for the increased pace of DDR [Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration], 
broader security-sector reforms (SSR), governance reform and the proposed 
creation of a war crimes tribunal.10 
  
As Jihadi credentials became “a liability,”11 warlords were either co-opted or abandoned 
by the US and international organizations to favor the construction of the central state.12 Zalmay 
Khalilzad, former Special Presidential Envoy and US Ambassador to Afghanistan, recalls:  
 
We worked with President Karzai to persuade major regional leaders to give up 
their arms in exchange for an opportunity to become legitimate political actors, 
either through appointments to new positions or though entry into electoral 
politics.13 
  In this context of weak international demand for proxies and increasing role of the US 
State Department over strictly military considerations, Afghan warlords had no choice but to 
transform their bases of power. At times when the state becomes stronger, warlords transition 
into something else: they become businessmen, notables, ministers, governors, etc. They become 
dormant warlords. Because of the kind of authority that they have in their communities and their 
ability to conduct international relations, they can make the transition back to being warlords if 
the opportunity presents. They exercise a surprising ability to shape  shift. They reinvent 
themselves and instrumentalize what westerners perceive as social disorder to ensure their 
survival in a changing political environment.  
 
Dostum: The “Unsavory Friend”14 
In the 1990s, Abdul Rashid Dostum was the most powerful warlord of Northern Afghanistan. 
His case illustrates both the early ties that were created between coalition forces and warlords 
and the long-lasting relationships that some warlords manage to initiate and maintain with 
regional neighbors (in this case with Turkey). It also shows how they take advantage of this.  
In spite of his reputation as a violent and self-interested man, Dostum provided the US 
with a powerful ally on the ground. He immediately recognized that the US-led intervention 
would give him the opportunity to turn his situation around (both militarily and financially) and 
reaffirm his local authority. He thus embraced a pro-American stance and became “absolutely 
gaga on America.”15 He cooperated fully with CIA paramilitary officers and US Special Forces, 
with whom he and his men created what journalist Doug Stanton described as a “familial 
bond.”16 Together, and with the help of other Northern Alliance’s commanders, they were 
quickly able to recapture Mazar-e Sharif.17  
Dostum’s political opponents have accused him of being sympathetic to American 
interests, calling him an American stooge. “Dostum is like clay, [the Americans] can shape him 
however they wish,” said a Northern Alliance source.18 But as subsequent events show, the 
Americans also were clay in Dostum’s hands. The Uzbek leader used his warrior ethos—which 
resonates particularly well with US Special Forces—as a tool to increase his power. He told 
foreign forces what they wanted to hear to benefit from this new relationship, calling American 
troops his “friends.”19 General Dostum organized a farewell ceremony for them, offered them 
presents, and even erected a memorial to honor a deceased CIA paramilitary officer. 
Dostum’s collaboration with the US allowed him to rearm and remobilize, but it was also 
instrumental to his power in many other ways. Like other warlords, Dostum has used foreigners 
as a way of legitimizing and strengthening his local authority, as his arrival in Mazar-e Sharif 
perfectly illustrates: “Spencer understood that Dostum wanted to be seen riding alongside the 
Americans as they entered [Mazar]…[Dostum] suggested that they hoist an American flag on a 
pole attached to the buggy,” wrote Stanton.20 Like many others, Dostum also tried to 
instrumentalize American forces to get rid of his opponents by asking them to strike what he 
claimed were Taliban safe houses.21  
An elite unit of US Special Forces continued advising Dostum long after the fall of 
Mazar-e Sharif and the signature of the Bonn agreement. They travelled in his car, sat by his side 
during military briefings,22 and became so intimate with him and his men that they reportedly 
“took an inaugural dip in [Dostum’s] new indoor pool” almost a year after the beginning of the 
US-led intervention.23 The significance of this form of diplomacy in fact lies in the extent to 
which Dostum was able to personalize his relations with Americans. Warlord diplomacy is a 
distinctive form of diplomacy that exploits personal networks as much as formal ties, and is 
conducted to enhance personal authority. One would imagine that the US exercise of power 
would occur along more formal bureaucratic lines and would be applied in support of a state-
building project. Instead, Dostum’s close personal ties, right down to individual soldiers 
accompanying him, showed how he could manipulate this set of foreign relations to bolster his 
personalized form of authority. 
In the past twenty years, Dostum has acquired the reputation of being “a thoroughly self-
interested man,”24 who “goes where the wind blows.”25 Pakistani journalist and expert on South 
Asia Ahmed Rashid claims that Dostum has “been on every country’s payroll, receiving funds 
from Russia, Uzbekistan, Iran, Pakistan and lately Turkey.”26 Dostum owes his survival, above 
all else, to his ability to conduct his own diplomacy (both towards foreign and domestic actors) 
in a highly pragmatic fashion that accommodates to immediate conditions. This is nowhere better 
exemplified than in his relationship with Turkey, which has offered him great support over the 
years and has clearly been instrumental to his political and physical survival. 
Dostum’s relations with Turkey have been conducted along more formal channels than 
the ones with the US, though personal networks have also played a critical role, at least initially. 
Dostum managed to develop contacts with that country through Azad Beg, a Turkish nationalist 
who mobilized Uzbeks and Turkmens from northern Afghanistan in the fight against the Soviet 
Union. Through his family connections—his cousin, Mirza Aslam Beg, was Pakistan’s Chief of 
Army Staff—Azad Beg became the chief contact between Dostum and the Pakistani 
intelligence.27 He then developed ties with Turkey, which started to finance Dostum’s party (the 
Junbesh). Turkey has been supporting Dostum ever since, as illustrated by the Akbar Bai 
episode.28  
Akbar Bai is an Afghan of Turkmen ethnicity, head of Afghanistan’s Association of 
Islamic Turks, and former Junbesh representative in Kabul, who was sacked in 2004 for not 
being in line with the party’s policy.29 In 2007, he began to vehemently accuse Dostum of killing 
Turkmen and Uzbeks, of possessing arm depots, and of entertaining close links with the ISI and 
the Taliban.30 A number of minor episodes followed these declarations, during which Dostum’s 
dog was allegedly kidnapped and Akbar Bai’s office was set on fire.31 In November 2007, the 
Turkmen leader was arrested by a local branch of the National Directorate of Security under 
Dostum’s control on charges of insurgency activities and masterminding an attempt on the 
general’s life.32  
The tensions between Dostum and Akbar Bai reached another level in the night of 
February 2, 2008, as the general’s men reportedly beat up Akbar Bai and members of his family, 
kidnapped him, and brought him back to Dostum’s palace in Kabul.33 When police surrounded 
the tacky pink mansion, Dostum appeared on the roof, allegedly drunk. According to media 
reports, President Karzai refused permission to make an arrest; Dostum released Akbar Bai; and 
the standoff ended.34 
While Akbar Bai demanded that Dostum be officially prosecuted,35 the attorney-general 
argued that bringing Dostum to court would be difficult for it could provoke factional fighting in 
northern Afghanistan. “[Even] in those places where the rule of law does exist, sometimes we 
cannot enforce the law over some people,” he said after Turkey allegedly interceded with Karzai 
and with the UN to protect the Uzbek leader.36 For former US envoy to the Afghan resistance 
Peter Tomsen, the Afghan president “[worried] that arresting Dostum could destabilize the 
relatively stable northern provinces.”37 In fact, a spokesman for Dostum warned of unrest in 
seven or eight northern provinces if the police tried to arrest the general.38 After news of the 
siege emerged, hundreds of protestors demonstrated in Maymana, capital of Faryab province, to 
support Dostum, threatening to pick up weapons against the government if the police did not 
leave the Uzbek leader alone.39  
Dostum was placed under house-arrest and suspended from all official positions after he 
refused to comply with the attorney-general’s summon for interrogation.40 In December 2008, a 
special plane was chartered by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan who had reached an 
agreement with Karzai to put an end to the Akbar Bai case. All charges would be dropped under 
the condition that Dostum would stay in exile indefinitely.41 The spokesman for the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that his country had sent a plane for him because he was 
“the honorary leader of [the] Turkish community in Afghanistan.”42 Less than a year later, right 
before the 2009 presidential election, Dostum made a triumphant and surprising return to his 
northern stronghold of Shibirghan, where crowds of followers gathered as a choir sang “Our 
King is coming.”43 Karzai, in need of the Uzbek vote, had decided to bring him back—a move 
that provoked the ire of the international community. 
While it is common for leaders of a part of a country (such as Canada’s Quebec, 
Belgium’s Wallonia and so forth) to conduct their own relations with officials in other countries, 
Dostum’s conduct is calculated to highlight to observers the extent to which he, rather than the 
government, is the central authority responsible for northern Afghanistan’s international affairs. 
This role enhances his image as a patron and as the apex of power in his region. To foreigners, 
working with Dostum has seemed necessary and pragmatic; to him, international connections are 
critical to asserting personal power against the state-building enterprise. Dostum’s post-2001 
authority stems directly from his ability to concentrate multiple sources of power while 
preventing his competitors from doing the same. What mattered to Dostum has been to remain 
the only Turkic leader able to combine political and military power, as well as the ability to act 
in the international system to receive international protection.  
 
Ismail Khan: The Amir of Western Afghanistan 
Ismail Khan is a “creature of the borderland.”44 He is the perfect illustration of the way warlords 
have taken advantage of the heterogeneity of the international system in post-2001 Afghanistan 
to increase their local autonomy. “The Lion of Herat” portrayed himself as a bulwark against 
terrorism to benefit from American largesse, while at the same time receiving extensive support 
from Iran. In October 2001, he expressed his willingness to cooperate with whoever could 
advance his interests: “To win, we need more money, men and weapons. We’re willing to accept 
help from whoever has our best interest in mind.”45  
Ismail Khan’s position vis-à-vis the US has been ambiguous and ambivalent from the 
very beginning of the intervention. The Herati leader always publicly opposed the presence of 
foreign troops because he understood that they would limit his ability to rule Western 
Afghanistan as he pleased. Interviewed via satellite phone in early October 2001, he said: “We 
have no desire to see any foreign troops on our soil. The coalition’s mission is to provide 
assistance for the liberation of Afghanistan from terrorist occupation by the Pakistanis and the 
Arabs. The mission is not to impose a new type of foreign rule.”46 In other words, the US-led 
intervention should not aim at building a conventional Weberian state.  
After he had regained control of Herat, Ismail Khan became more confrontational vis-à-
vis the US: he called the deployment of American and British soldiers “a mistake,”47 and 
declared that Afghanistan did not need outside help to form a representative government.48 
“[We] do not need the American expert…We have gained enough experience from 23 years of 
war,”49 he said. After the signature of the Bonn agreement in December 2001, Ismail Khan stated 
that no international troops would be allowed to stay into his territory.50 Since 2001, he has 
consistently reiterated his disapproval of foreign interference through the conduct of high-level 
diplomacy of a sort commonly reserved for formally recognized sovereign states.51 
 Ismail Khan has managed to portray himself as a leader able to deal on an equal foot 
with powerful heads of states and diplomats, which has in turn strengthened his local legitimacy. 
His oft-reaffirmed anti-American stance also increased his ideological power; yet it was 
compatible with accepting considerable resources and behind the scenes support from foreign 
forces. The main point at this stage in Ismail Khan’s political evolution was that he was able to 
force foreigners and the government in the capital to take him seriously as an autonomous 
political force and realize that they needed to negotiate with him and take his interests into 
account in any wider political arrangement. Simply put, Ismail Khan was trying to take 
advantage of the international situation without paying the price—in this case formal allegiance 
to the state. By holding private meetings with foreign officials, Ismail Khan demonstrated to 
observers that he should be regarded as the leader of western Afghanistan.52  
By February 2002, Ismail Khan seemed to have softened his tone towards the US, 
declaring that he would abide by the government’s decision regarding foreign forces: “Whenever 
the center of government is recognizing that their presence in Herat is needed, we never 
prohibit,”53 he said. By March 2002, Ismail Khan had agreed both for a UN office to be reopened 
and for a civil affairs unit to be stationed in Herat.54 About 10 US Special Forces soldiers also 
spent several months in one of his guesthouses. They developed a close relationship with him 
and supported him financially.55 “Fights were still going on…Giving…money [to the warlords] 
was the normal thing to do to keep them on your side,” justified a western diplomat.56  
At the same time that he developed his relationship with the US, Ismail Khan also got 
strong support from Iran.57 Although he never officially admitted receiving weapons and 
ammunition, he did not conceal his good relationship with his western neighbor. He always 
considered that not dealing with Iran would be “unnatural,” considering their geographic and 
personal historical ties.58 In early 2002, observers reported that Ismail Khan’s soldiers were 
trained by Iranian advisers, wore Iranian fatigues, and carried Iranian-made rifles.59 Iran even 
allegedly sent money to Ismail Khan to pay for his soldiers,60 as well as provided him with tanks 
captured from the Taliban.61 
As the strongest armed actor in western Afghanistan, Ismail Khan found himself at the 
center of a power struggle between Iran and the US, and took great advantage of this peculiar 
situation. Said Ahmed Rashid:  
 
I think there is a kind of competition going on to gain the favor of the local 
warlord, Ismail Khan, who controls three of the western provinces that border Iran 
…He is a master at this game. He’s been playing it for the last 10, 15 years. And 
he frankly has been taking advantage of the Americans and the Iranians. He’s 
getting them both to start reconstruction in the region he controls, building roads 
and other things. As far as he’s concerned, and as far as the local Herati people 
are concerned, he’s, you know, been playing a very wise game, which has been 
helping him and helping the territory under his control.62  
 
In a typical Afghan ploy, the wily Ismail Khan made sure that the Iranians and the 
Americans spent most of the time watching each other rather than him, as he fed 
them with tidbits of misinformation and gossip that kept their daggers drawn.63  
 
Both the US and Iran were desperately in need of a strong ally to limit each other’s 
influence in the border region.64 Ismail Khan’s balancing act clearly allowed him to accumulate 
various sources of power, in particular military and economic ones. His military might gave him 
the means to control Herat and its region, and most of all, to control the borders and the 
economic benefits associated with it.65 It also gave Ismail Khan the opportunity to portray 
himself as the city’s one and only liberator, even though other factions were involved as well. 
Ismail Khan was able to further increase his local legitimacy by providing goods and services 
that were in fact paid for by American and Iranian money, custom revenues, and international 
aid. According to a UN official: 
 
[Ismail Khan] basically presented us with a shopping list of what he wants and 
stressed the urgency…But it also seems pretty clear that he wants it to be recognised 
that he is in charge in this region, not the UN, or western governments, or indeed, the 
government in Kabul.66 
 
It is true that “[much] of the power Ismail Khan and his fellow warlords enjoy was a 
byproduct of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan.”67 It is more accurate that Ismail Khan’s 
survival is largely due to his ability to navigate between different levels, and keep pressure on 
the various actors involved in western Afghanistan, by never fully cooperating with nor fully 
defying and antagonizing the central government and its allies. His central position in multiple 
networks enabled him to acquire military and economic power, which he could in turn use to 
resist Kabul’s homogenizing pressure and run his own fiefdom, without much interference from 
the center.   
 
Conclusion 
In the immediate post-intervention period, warlords such as Dostum and Ismail Khan developed 
complex marketing plans to boost their image. They used different “faces” (warrior, 
businessman, notable, ally against terrorism, etc.) to instrumentalize international actors who 
denounced warlords while praising in the same men the state ministers or the ethnic 
representatives.68 Confronted to a changing environment, warlords had to shape shift and 
become “dormant,” as they were no longer able to exert undisputed control over their territories. 
They used the heterogeneity of the international community to maintain authority and survive, 
both physically and politically.   
With the growing influence of the Taliban insurgency and the announced departure of US 
troops, political dynamics have radically changed in the past few years. The tensions between 
Hamid Karzai and the international community indirectly led the Afghan president, in need of 
local power-holders able to deliver votes, to bring the political brokers back into the loop prior to 
the 2009 presidential elections.69 Today, the uncertainty regarding the international community’s 
intentions in Afghanistan after 2014 creates a level of domestic uncertainty that drives the local 
demand for military leadership. Afghan warlords are reorganizing, remobilizing, reuniting, and 
evidence shows that they have the ability to circumvent both the Afghan state and the 
international community to exert their own kind of diplomacy and negotiate directly with the 
Taliban.70  
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